How gendered institutions constrain women's empowerment
the extent that it overrides a positive effect of resources.) In support of a macro-level analysis of empowerment, a useful database has become available with indicators for gendered institutions for most countries of the world (OECD, 2006) . Obviously, data on institutions that are qualitative have their limitations for quantitative analysis and require a careful assessment in terms of measurement and multi-collinearity. These limitations will be discussed.
The next section will briefly discuss the literature on empowerment. The two sections thereafter will introduce exploratory models and the data as well as the empirical analysis. The chapter ends with policy implications. I conclude that we need to transform formal and informal gendered institutions throughout society.
II

Women's empowerment
Recently, the empowerment literature has been enriched by conceptual and empirical work around issues of measurement, comparison, subjective/objective dimensions, and the recognition of different domains of empowerment (Narayan, 2005a; Walby, 2005; Alsop et. al., 2006; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007) . One of the definitions of empowerment emerging from this literature has been formulated by Deepa Nayaran (2005b, p. 5): "Empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives." Although there are some differences, the literature tends to agree that women's empowerment is a process involving agency (referred to in the definition above with words such as "negotiate", "influence", and "control"), access to resources (or assets), and institutions, which together affect how women are able to improve their well-being absolutely, and more importantly, relative to men. Moreover, research suggests that the three constitutive elements of empowerment-agency, resources and institutions-tend to be closely related, so that the absence of one element cannot, or can only partially be, compensated by the presence of another. Indeed, as the capability approach has pointed out, agency without resources is rather meaningless when being able to make one's own choices and having the self-confidence to do so are not matched by any real opportunities to choose from (Alkire, 2002; Robeyns, 2003) . The other way around is equally compelling in cases where women may have access to resources but feel constrained by internalized oppression from actually making use of the available resources (Sen, 1990; Nagar and Raju, 2003) .
The role of resources for women's empowerment is well understood. Already in 1986,
Pampel and Tanaka demonstrated a U-shaped relationship between economic development and the female labor force participation rate, in which the latter might be considered, though with qualifications, as a proxy for empowerment. More recent empirical studies have shown that access to land (Agarwal, 1994; Deere and Doss, 2006; Allendorf, 2007) , access to credit (Kabeer, 2001 ) and access to education (Jejeebhoy, 1995) are all important for women's empowerment, and, as other studies show, also for economic development (Klasen, 2002; Lagerlöf, 2003) . However, human capital investment is arguably most effective in a context of medium or high economic development, which is not always the case in agricultural economies relying on low technology. In such cases, education, in particular for women, may not be translated effectively through labor market participation into higher incomes and GDP growth (Barro, 2000) . 2 In general, however, the literature indicates that education, at least primary education, tends to have a positive effect on development, and for women through more routes than for men including lower fertility, which may contribute to women's empowerment.
The role of agency on women's empowerment, however, has only recently come under the attention of researchers. Agency has been defined "as an actor's or group's ability to make purposeful choices" (Alsop et al., 2006, p. 11) Women face a variety of intangible constraints to plan their lives, to choose their goals, and to make their own choices, inside and outside households, often more so than men. Such constraints, understood as gendered institutions (Goetz, 1997) , limit their opportunities both in terms of access to resources as well as their agency (Narayan, 2005b) . Both formal and informal institutions reflect power relations, since institutions tend to be supported and defended by those who derive advantages from them; for gendered institutions, these power relations are embedded in formal and informal expressions of patriarchy (Folbre, 1994; Goetz, 1997) . Formal gendered institutions then can be interpreted as codified gendered social norms such as inheritance laws, property rights, or the fiscal system, with different effects for women and men. On the other hand, informal gendered institutions can be understood as the set of non-codified social norms and cultural practices that impact differently on men and women. The influence of informal gendered institutions leads to stereotypes of masculine and feminine agency, as Bina Agarwal (1997, p. 1) has explained, by "ascribing to women and men different abilities, attitudes, desires, personality traits, behaviour patterns, and so on." This not only results in adaptive preferences 5 (Sen, 1990) that are an internalization of gender inequalities, but experimental research has indicated that gender stereotypes also lead to different self-evaluations, lowering women's selfesteem, motivation and confidence (Biernat et al., 1998; Shih et al., 2006) .
Most studies that pay attention to the impact of gendered institutions on women's empowerment have been carried out at the micro level. While these studies in general find a positive impact of access to resources on women's empowerment, empirical studies using detailed survey data and case study data indicate that this is not always the case due to the influence of gendered norms, networks, beliefs, and practices (Blumberg, 1991; Mayoux, 2001; Odebode and van Staveren, 2007) . For example, a detailed household bargaining study on China has recently found that the standard hypothesis on the role of resources in empowerment, "…that an increase in women's relative household income contribution will enable them greater household decision-making control, is not supported by any regression results" (MacPhail and Dong, 2007, p. 114) . Or, to give another example, Sharada Srinivasan and Arjun Bedi (2008) have found for Tamil Nadu that higher levels of education for women do not reduce the incidence of daughter elimination. So, the higher women's educational levels, the more often women undertake sex-selective abortions, and the stronger the inequality in the state's sex ratio.
These findings therefore suggest that it is relevant for the understanding of women's empowerment to focus not only on access to resources but also on the intangible constraints that prevent women from benefiting from them.
One way to analyze the impact of institutions on agency is a cross-country analysis in which differences in countries' gendered institutions are included in the analysis of women's empowerment. There are only very few studies available that have analyzed gendered institutions in relation to women's wellbeing at the macro level. They have found that labor 6 market segmentation, discrimination, high female unemployment rates and the gender wage gap all limit the benefits that women may derive from their education and labor force participation (Jayaweera, 1997; Elson, 1999; Seguino, 2000; Casale, 2004; Busse and Spielman, 2006 Figure 1 : formal and informal institutions influence women's access to resources, whereas these institutions and women's access to resources together influence women's achievements.
[ Figure 1 about here]
This role of gendered institutions reflects the views in the empowerment literature that gendered institutions not only affect women's and men's access to resources but also that they impact directly on women's achievements, through affecting their agency. Obviously, the direction of causality is not straightforward and various endogeneity effects may occur. For example, in looking at the access to resources box in Figure 1 , a higher ratio of female education is likely to increase the female non-agricultural labor force participation rate, whereas higher women's empowerment may increase the average age at marriage. Hence, the regressions results should be taken with caution, because coefficients and their estimated level of significance and/or R square may be biased upwards due to the implicit accumulation of feedback effects.
But, as indicated earlier, the data set has no observations over time. The estimations presented here only serve an exploratory purpose. The results may therefore best be interpreted as descriptive. Further research is clearly needed and will hopefully be able to reduce endogeneity effects (for a further discussion of measuring and modelling empowerment, see Khwaja, 2005) .
Hence, gendered institutions are not only likely to constrain women's access to resources, as others have argued with bivariate regression analysis of the same data set (Morrisson and Jütting, 8 2005) , but they are also likely to affect women's agency, directly affecting women's empowerment, irrespective of women's access to resources.
Variables and data
Data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2008) and the OECD -GID data base. These are the only two datasets with a substantial number of developing countries included for which gender disaggregated data are available. For achievements, the three variables selected are: female/male ratio in life expectancy, female/male ratio in young adult literacy (15-24 years), and female decision making power in politics and the economy. The life expectancy variable reflects women's relative health status, taken as the ratio of female over male life expectancy. The young adult literacy variable, as a ratio, was chosen because it reflects how current levels of illiteracy may be affected by resources and institutions. Moreover, literacy was preferred over school enrolment because literacy is an expected outcome of school enrolment, so it is more suitable as an achievement measure of well-being. The third achievement variable that was selected is a composite index of female decision making power, which is available in the data set as an unweighted average of three indicators that all refer to senior positions: the share of female parliamentarians in the political arena, the share of women among administrators and managers in the administrative arena, and the share of women among professionals and technical specialists, which are top occupations in the standard classifications of occupations.
The two resource variables are key variables in the empowerment literature: access to education and paid employment. They are measured as the gender gap (a ratio) in the combined primary and secondary school enrolment rate and the female share (a percentage) of the nonagricultural labor force. The first one broadly reflects women's relative educational levels compared to men, excluding tertiary education since in many developing countries there is only a small minority of both men and women enrolled at that level. The second resource variable, the female share of the non-agricultural labor force, reflects women's relative access to paid labor.
Women's share of the agricultural labor force was excluded because in many developing countries, this includes a large proportion of unpaid family workers who do not derive an independent income from their work.
The variables on gendered institutions lie between zero and one: the more asymmetric the institutions are, disadvantaging women, the closer the values are to one. The variables for gendered institutions for this article were chosen from the thirteen gendered institutions in the GID database. I have selected these using the following two criteria 4 . First, variables that are very country or religion specific were dropped, such as polygamy and the obligation to wear a veil in public. Second, there is a risk of multicollinearity when including all available variables in the regression equation. I selected correlations of less than 0.50, with one exception: the Pearson zero-order correlations between the four property rights variables are quite high:
inheritance laws, land rights, credit rights and other property rights 5 . From these four variables, I
therefore selected only one, namely the variable for land rights. The reason is that these are key for women in developing countries, probably more urgent than other property rights.
Six gendered institutional variables are useful for the empirical analysis, representing three formal and three informal institutions. The three formal gendered institutions (FGI) included are:
 parental authority: measures whether women have the same right to be a legal guardian of a child during marriage, and whether women have custody rights over a child after divorce.
 land rights: measures women's right and de facto access to agricultural land.
 laws against violence against women: measures the existence of women's legal protection against violent attacks such as rape, assault and sexual harassment.
The three informal gendered institutions (IFGI) included are:
 female genital mutilation: measures the share of women who have been subjected to any type of female genital cutting.
 early marriage: measures the percentage of girls between the ages of 15 and 19 who are married, divorced or widowed, providing an indication of forced or arranged marriages.
 missing women: son preference reflects the economic valuation of women; the variable missing women measures gender bias in mortality due to sex selective abortions or insufficient care given to baby girls.
The GID institutional database has in most cases transformed qualitative information into quantitative data, which necessarily involves some degree of subjectivity. On the other hand, much of the information refers to laws, which are either in place or not, while a few other variables are already quantitative, such as the extent of early marriage. 6 A second limitation of the GID database is that it uses a single observation about gendered institutions for a variety of years because of lack of availability of all information for every single year. This, however,
should not be a very serious problem because gendered institutions tend to change slowly over time, as is the case with institutions in general (Hodgson, 2006) . The GID database contains the kind of institutional data that others also have used in analyzing women's empowerment, for example: Karen Oppenheim Mason (2005) , using data on freedom of movement and wife beating for five Asian countries; and Jayaweera (1997) and Christiaan Grootaert (2005) , using the UNDP Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) for the analysis of women's empowerment in developing countries and in transition economies. The empirical analyses in the models shown below include between 53 and 153 countries, depending on data availability for the variables used in the various models.
IV Empirical analysis 7
Resource Models
The first step in the empirical analysis, as portrayed in Figure 1 , is the testing of the resource models for education and employment. The two models have independent variables for resources (RES i ), with i referring to women's relative access to education and their share in the non-agricultural labour force. The dependent variables are a constant, C, the six gendered institutions, referred to as GI j , with ε as the error term:
The differential impact of formal and informal gendered institutions can be analyzed by aggregating the institutional variables into two composite indexes, one for formal and one for informal gendered institutions, FGI and IFGI respectively.
The results of the regressions with the resources models, using aggregate variables for the gendered institutions, are shown in [ Table 1 about here] [ Table 2 about here]
For the second empirical model, with the female share of the non-agricultural labor force as the dependent variable, results again show three of the six institutional variables being statistically significant, but only one is the same as in the education model. Of the three nonsignificant variables two have an unexpected sign, which is difficult to interpret, but parameter values are low. The three variables that are statistically significant all have expected negative signs: parental authority (-0.09), early marriage (-0.34), and missing women (-0.19) . In other words, the more parental authority is granted to the father and the higher the extent of early marriage and missing women, the lower is women's access to the non-agricultural labour force.
These negative relationships can be explained by underlying patriarchal norms that limit 13 women's freedom to earn an independent income outside a family farm and apart from domestic responsibilities.
Although both models have women's access to resources as dependent variables, they clearly have different results. This is because access to education and access to non-agricultural employment measure two different types of resources, which do not necessarily go together. In some countries, women have higher levels of education than men (Argentina and Lesotho, for example), while having relatively low levels of labor force participation, whereas in other countries women's education is very low while they participate in the non-agricultural labour force at a rate that does not differ very much from men, as is the case in various African and South Asian countries. Education provides women with knowledge and information to make their own choices, while paid employment provides them with the actual means to make choices that would require resources and may go against the will of a male partner in the household.
Therefore, they do not measure the same thing. As a result, we would not expect a high correlation coefficient between these two dependent variables. This was confirmed in a test with cross-correlations between the female/male education ratio and the female share of the nonagricultural labour force, which resulted in r = 0.45.
The exploratory resource models have two implications. First, they show that the more asymmetric gender norms and practices are, the less is women's access to resources. This confirms the bivariate results obtained by the initiators of the GID database, Christian Morrisson and Johannes Jütting (2005) . Second, the models suggest that informal gendered institutions are more often a constraint for women's access to resources than formal gendered institutions: in each of the two models, two informal against one formal institutional variable were statistically 14 significant. This suggests that social norms put a stronger constraint on women's access to resources than laws and regulations.
Achievement Models
The models for women's achievements can be specified as follows, in line with the model in Figure 1 : The results for the aggregate achievement models are shown in Table 3 , and for the disaggregate achievement models are shown in Table 4 . It is important to note here that lack of data for some variables has seriously reduced the number of countries included, in particular for 15 model 2, on youth literacy. This makes the results of the second model not very well comparable with the other two models.
[ Tables 3 and 4 about here]
The results presented in Table 3 indicate again that both formal and informal gendered institutions impact negatively upon women's empowerment. In all three aggregate achievement models, both types of institutions appear to be statistically significant, with similar parameter sizes. Table 5 's results indicate quite varied relationships for women's empowerment. The achievement model for the gender gap in health, measured as the male/female ratio in life expectancy, shows that the level of GDP per capita has a relatively strong positive impact (0.09).
Also the squared income variable is significant, but negative (-0.01), implying a nonlinear effect of income. This may suggest that men are catching up with women's life expectancy rate when countries get richer, with women following less healthy lifestyles, including smoking and becoming overweight, in richer countries (for a study on the US, see Ezzati et al., 2008) . Of the two resource variables, only one is statistically significant, women's access to education (-0.06), but it has a negative sign, which is difficult to interpret. Two formal gendered institutions do have a statistically significant negative impact on women's relative health: parental authority (-0.02) and land rights (-0.04 ). This suggests that gender biased laws and regulations have a stronger impact on women's relative health achievements than gender norms and beliefs.
The achievement model for the gender gap in youth literacy shows that GDP is not statistically significant, whereas GDP squared is only barely so, and negative. Income, hence, does not seem to be a strong determinant of women's relative educational achievements. As expected, the gender gap in the lagged primary school enrollment rate is positive and statistically significant (0.79) (see Table 4 ). This may suggest that the international efforts to achieve the third goal of the Millennium Development Goals, which is on gender equality in education, may not depend so much on economic development in general but on spending on girls' education. In addition, the informal institution of early marriage appears to be influential (-.29), and statistically significant, which has a clear link to girl's access to education.
The final achievement model in Table 4 , the model for women's decision making power in the last column, shows again a different picture. Here, the level of economic development has a relatively strong statistically significant impact, again suggesting nonlinearity (0.21 for GDP and -0.01 for GDP squared). Women's relative access to jobs has a relatively strong positive and statistically significant impact on women's decision making power (0.23). This may be explained probably not only by the income effect but also by the social participation effect-that is, a strengthening of women's agency-of non-agricultural jobs for women. This effect is important for taking up leadership positions in politics, administration, and management. Finally, when looking at the results for gendered institutions, we see that none of the coefficients is statistically significant. Hence, it is not so much unequal laws or biased social norms that constrain women's leadership roles, but rather low labour force participation and low level of economic development which form hurdles for women to break through the glass ceiling in the economy and politics.
V Conclusions and policy implications
The overall picture from the extended women's empowerment model and exploratory empirical results is fourfold. First, the level of development has an important impact on women's achievements in health and political and economic decision making power, but not on literacy.
Also, income seems to have a nonlinear effect on women's achievements. Second, in each of the three achievement models (in Table 3 ), one of the two resources variables is statistically significant (even though the negative sign could not be explained in the health achievement model). Third, depending on the type of achievement, different gendered institutions play a role, or none at all. For health, formal institutions appear to be significant constraints, for education it was an informal institution that appears to limit women's achievements, whereas for political and economic influence, none of the gendered institutions seems to matter. The results suggest that gender policies would be more effective when contextualized to a country's binding constraints in terms of specific laws, regulations, social norms and cultural practices that may negatively affect particular dimensions of women's empowerment. Thus, legal changes may need to be prioritized to improve women's relative health, whereas the traditional practice of early marriage would be a more likely candidate to address for achieving MDG 3. Fourth, the results point out that women's access to resources is important but not sufficient for women's empowerment.
Formal and informal gendered institutions both put a constraint on women's agency, which prevents them from turning their resources effectively into wellbeing achievements.
Of course, these are only exploratory results that require further exploration beyond the descriptive analysis provided here. They suggest, however, that gender policies may become more effective when they are contextualized, and not only help women to increase their access to resources, but also address the constraints to their agency from laws, regulations, norms and practices that underlie particular gendered institutions.
Indeed, two types of policies are relevant: (1) legal changes towards equal treatment of women and men, and the enforcement of such laws, focusing on changing formal gendered institutions; (2) awareness campaigns and civil society pressure towards abandoning traditional 18 norms and cultural patterns, focusing on informal gendered institutions. I will briefly discuss examples of policies in both areas, drawing from the development literature.
Women tend to be the major food growers in the developing world. They work on family land, communal land, and land owned by male relatives (only a very small percentage of women owns the land that she works). This lack of land titles has several consequences for women's role as food producers, limiting their empowerment and leading to inefficiencies. First, without a land title, she cannot obtain credit for improving land productivity, because she cannot use the land she works as collateral. This, for example, will not allow poor women to join irrigation projects or to purchase drought animals or fertilizer. Hence, there will be under-investment in the land that women grow, and women will find it difficult to meet the needs for sufficient food in their households, or will spend inefficient amounts of labor time (Agarwal, 1994) . Second, without a legitimate hold on the land, she has little decision making power over the use of the land (Doss, 1999) . This may lead to the use of (parts of) the land for cash crops by her husband or other male relatives, or the sale of the land to satisfy cash needs of male owners. This puts pressure on women's role, as part of the gender division of labor in rural households, as food provider: a woman would need to purchase food if she can no longer grow it, and therefore needs to find wage work, which is scarce and often very hard work, without a formal contract. Third, the lack of legitimacy of her land claim also leads to limited control over her own labor time for production on the land: other household members tend to claim women's labor time for cash crop production on their own lands, without compensation. Research has pointed out, however, that with a shift of resources such as labour and fertilizer, from male to female plots, total household production would increase (Udry et al., 1995) . Moreover, when men claim women's labor to work on their own land without compensation, this can result in an aggregate under-supply of cash crops, because of the low work input or effort that women will provide without any sharing in the cash crop earnings (Warner and Campbell, 2000) .
In addition, women's land rights contribute to women's bargaining power in other realms of life, simply because their value to the household goes up. This contributes directly to their empowerment. The research referred to above has pointed at women's land rights leading to lower fertility, lower unpaid workload, better health status and more education for their daughters.
A second policy affecting women's empowerment involves the power of civil society action where the enforcement of law is lacking, as in the successful action of groups in various African countries to ban harmful practices. An illustrative example comes from Ethiopia, where I studied women's empowerment and bargaining in households (Mabsout and van Staveren, 2010) . In Ethiopia, for example, female genital mutilation (FGM) is prohibited, polygamy has been abolished and the legal minimum marriage age for girls has been increased from 15 to 18 years (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003; Bevan and Pankhurst, 2007) . Informal norms, however, remain strong, so that the practices are still widespread. Seventy-four percent of the women are circumcised according to household survey data from the Demographic and Health Survey 2005, and polygamy still occurs (Bevan and Pankhurst, 2007) , while traditional practices and customs dominate marriage practices, such as kidnapping and girl child brides, in spite of the legal reforms (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2002) . The federal government has limited capacity to enforce the laws (WHO, 1999) , whereas various Ethiopian states have been granted full sovereignty, which allows them to practice earlier laws that discriminate against women (World Bank, 1998 Notes: Standardized coefficients (beta) with t-statistics in brackets.
Level of significance for t-statistics for independent variables and for F-statistic for adjusted R 2 ; *= p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 3 The list of all variables is available from the author. 4 It should be noted that for some variables, for developed countries there is (almost) no variation. But excluding the developed countries from the analysis would result in a dramatic reduction in the number of cases, with subsequent negative impact on the econometric results.
Sources: GID and World Development Indicators 2006
For property rights and parental authority the values are zero for all but one OECD country. Only for violence, there is considerable variation for OECD countries, with a mean of 0.31 and a standard deviation of 0.16. Early marriage also has some variation for OECD countries.
5 A table of these correlations is available from the author.
